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The “nationality question” did not single-handedly undo 
the Soviet Union, but it was a critical factor in the erosion of 
state authority during the perestroika years and remains an 
issue of enormous importance in Russian life and politics today. 
Given this fact, it’s no surprise that the interconnecting topics 
of state nationality policy and interethnic relations have drawn 
considerable attention from Western specialists. The closeness 
of the period to the current day means that the work of historians 
understandably figures less in this literature than that of scholars 
in the social sciences, specifically: political scientists, economists, 
sociologists, and anthropologists. But historians have nonetheless 
entered the fray, making valuable contributions, in particular 
in regards to the study of historical memory, which has been a 
key area affecting social identity and interethnic relations in the 
post-Soviet decades.
One valuable question to ask of the literature is precisely 
what Western social scientists have contributed to the analysis of 
nationality and ethnicity-related questions versus the contributions 
made by Russian scholars and other specialists from the region. 
On the one hand, opportunities for academic collaboration 
and exchange have increased dramatically since end of the 
USSR. More Russian and Western experts now share contacts, 
methodologies, and even arguments regarding nationality-related 
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issues. They collaborate on research teams and sit on each other’s conference panels. 
In that regard, one can speak of genuine movement towards the formation of a single 
scholarly community with a shared disciplinary language. Yet it’s also true that scholarly 
differences remain, perhaps most saliently in regards to the key terms of the topic: ethnicity 
and nationality. For most Western specialists, the two terms represent fundamentally 
constructed and fluid categories deeply influenced by institutional contexts. Thus 
nations and ethnicities tend to be treated as “made” rather than “born” and are seen as 
inherently multifaceted and changing. By and large, however, Russian-based specialists 
remain less inclined to constructivist interpretations of this sort — or put another way, 
they tend to be more accepting of what the American sociologist Rogers Brubaker has 
described as the “realist, substantialist understanding” of nationality, one that regards 
nations “as real entities, as communities, and as substantial, enduring collectivities”2.
Given this difference, a potential contribution of Western scholarship lies in its 
extending an alternative conceptual framework to Russian specialists. Besides this, it’s 
also clear that experts from Europe and North America bring an outsider’s subjectivity 
to questions of interethnic relations in Russian space, since they tend to approach the 
topic, implicitly if not explicitly, through the lens of their own societies’ experiences. 
This, too, has the potential to offer opportunities for debate and constructive exchange. 
Finally, Western scholars also tend to have a more skeptical view than their Russian 
counterparts of the supposed distinctiveness of the Russian case. President Vladimir 
Putin noted in a major 2012 statement on the “national question” that Russia has a unique 
history of integrating yet also respecting the differences of the various ethnicities of the 
state, such that Russians today represent both “a single people” and “a multinational 
society”3. Many Russian-based experts would likely agree with this statement. More 
experts in the West might disagree or at least challenge some of its implicit assumptions.
The following paper reviews Western scholarship on the questions of nationality 
politics and interethnic relations in Russia in the post-Soviet decades, starting with an 
assessment of Western research on the role played by the national factor in the collapse 
of the Soviet state.
The Nationality Question and the End of the USSR
At the time of its demise, the Soviet Union was not, formally speaking, an empire. In 
fact, the Bolshevik architects of the Soviet state, all of whom were ardent anti-imperialists, 
purposefully fashioned their new country to be the ultimate retort to the Russian Empire 
of old, not an empire but rather its exact opposite: a multinational union that would build 
socialism, while at the same time protecting and promoting national cultures4.
Yet for all its expressly anti-imperial bearing, the new multinational union nonetheless 
looked and acted a great deal like the empire it replaced. For one, it sprawled across 
much of the same territory and consisted of the same two basic parts: a mostly Russian 
center surrounded by a largely non-Russian periphery. Like the old empire, its institutions 
remained Russocentric, while Russian remained the dominant language. On the face 
of it, the new union formally allowed the union republics the right to secede from the 
country — a boldly democratic innovation compared to the old empire. But the republics 
were obviously not allowed to use that right. And even the new state’s commitment to 
promoting non-Russian languages, territories, economic regions, and national cultures, 
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while radically different from the tsarist approach, was not quite as anti-imperial as it might 
seem. The USSR was famously supposed to be “national in form, socialist in content,” 
but this slogan was deceptive — or rather, simply beside the point. While Tatarness 
was encouraged for Tatars and Buryatness for Buryats, the socialism that Tatars and 
Buryats — and every other national group in the state — were expected to embrace was 
predicated on Russian norms. As a result, one could be forgiven for being confused. 
After all, if non-Russians were expected to be non-Russian in form but mostly Russian 
in content, how non-Russian were they really expected to be? 
Given all this, it’s perhaps understandable that non-Russians would develop a 
powerfully anti-imperial critique of Soviet power and ultimately come to see the break-
up of the USSR as a process of decolonization5. Interestingly, influential Russian critics 
ultimately ended up in the same spot, concluding that they, the Russians, had themselves 
been unfairly colonized by the Communist Party, and both these interpretive tendencies 
came to a head during the perestroika years. As British historian Dominic Lieven has 
observed, in the mid-to-late 1980s, as Gorbachev began to restructure the economy, 
both Russians and non-Russians alike began “restructuring” their thinking of themselves, 
and as they did, they came to view the USSR — a. k. a, “the center,” “Moscow,” or 
simply “Soviet power” (sovetskaia vlast’) — as the abiding enemy of all their “essential, 
authentic, [and] natural national aspirations”6. What transpired under perestroika, in 
effect, was a cognitive shift that redefined the USSR as empire. Once this mental turn 
took place, especially against the backdrop of profound economic distress, the ruling 
order rapidly shed legitimacy and soon found itself teetering and then falling apart. 
For Western specialists on the USSR, this turn of events was paradoxically both 
shocking and predictable. On the one hand, the presumption that the Soviet Union 
was an empire was a commonplace of conservative and to a degree, even mainstream 
discourses during the Cold War era. Though liberals often shied from the term “empire” 
since it raised questions about the legitimacy of the Soviet state, conservatives and 
moderates deployed it much more readily, and consequently references to “the Soviet 
empire,” “the last empire,” and “Red imperialism” abounded. (In 1983, US President 
Ronald Reagan famously added “evil empire” to the list.) In this regard, from a Western 
Cold Warrior’s perspective, in particular from a US Cold Warrior’s perspective, there was 
nothing necessarily surprising about the anti-imperial critique that began to develop in 
Soviet society during the Gorbachev era since the critique was perceived as entirely 
correct. The shocking part was that Gorbachev was allowing the critique to appear 
and, very importantly, that it began rapidly acquiring serious political implications. This 
was utterly unprecedented and caught Western experts unprepared because, for all 
that rhetorical references to the USSR as an empire were familiar, deeper attention to 
Soviet nationality questions was not. Most Western experts on the USSR were Russian 
specialists. They did not know other Soviet languages and had little feel for the complex 
topography of nationality issues within the Soviet state. Consequently, when the Soviet 
order collapsed in 1991, in part due to unresolved nationality tensions and pressures, 
they were as stunned as anyone.
Flowing from this, arguably the most significant problem that has engaged 
Western experts on Russia and the Soviet Union since 1991 is to explain the remarkable 
development of the Soviet collapse. Why did a multinational union that had existed for over 
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seventy years seemingly suddenly fall apart? What made nationality such an explosive 
force during the glasnost’ years? How were national and ethnic identities mobilized? Did 
nationalism undo the Soviet state and if it did, did it have to? That is, could nationalism 
have been anything other than a disintegrationist force? Could the Soviet government 
have reacted differently and survived?
Of the various approaches to these issues taken in the field, one of the most 
important thus far has pointed to the unwitting role the structure of the Soviet state played 
in its own demise. As scholars writing in this “institutionalist” suggest, the USSR was 
created to function as an “ethno-federal state” — that is, as a “federal political system in 
which territorial administrative units [would be] invested with ethnic character”7. According 
to this design, theoretically at least, every Soviet national group was to receive its own 
territory, and living that way, the expectation, of course, was that all the groups would 
then live happily together. Yet, as scholars such as Valerie Bunce and Rogers Brubaker 
have argued, when subject to external pressures, it is precisely this type of ethno-federal 
structure that is most likely to weaken and come undone. That is, this type of structure 
appears considerably more susceptible to disintegrationist tensions, it would seem, 
than the structure of unitary states, even ones with mixed populations. Thus ethnically 
divided but unitary Romania managed to survive its rocky “post-Communist transition” 
in one piece, while the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia all fell apart8.
In a series of influential articles from the late 1990s, Philip G. Roeder laid out a 
now widely accepted two-step view of how this process of state devolution unfolded in 
the Soviet case. First, during what we could call Stage One, the early elaboration of an 
ethno-federal structure for the USSR creates the unintended effect of reinforcing ethnic 
identities and practices. This process of ethnic reinforcement then proceeds apace, 
passing through varying levels of intensity, over the course of subsequent decades, 
eventually building to the point of saturating the entire ethno-territorial framework with 
sub-Union-level national meaning. Then during Stage Two, as the tumultuous reforms 
of the glasnost’ and perestroika period begin, they, again unwittingly, inject enormous 
instability into the ethno-federal system and end up giving regional leaders both the 
room and the material incentive they need “to play the ethnic card” and gradually syphon 
off power from Moscow9. A design meant to keep all the ethnicities united around the 
center thus unintentionally ushers in a dynamic that allows the ethnicities — or rather 
the leaders claiming to speak for them — to ignore the center and go their own way. 
Since the appearance of Roeder’s work, other scholars have amplified and added their 
own elaborations to this basic institutionalist interpretation10.
In a somewhat different vein, Henry E. Hale has argued that a key ingredient in the 
break-up of the USSR was the existence of the Russian Federation as a “core ethnic 
region” within the state. As he notes: “Core ethnic regions [within ethno-territorial 
federations] tend to promote state break-up because they facilitate dual sovereignty, 
exacerbate the security fears of minority-group regions, and promote the ‘imagining’ of 
core-group identifications independent of the federation. For the USSR, this proved a 
deadly combination”11. Though Hale stops short of saying it, the stark fact of the existence 
of this ethnic Russian “core” at the center of the state also served as a reminder ton on-
Russians of their country’s powerful resemblance to an archetypal empire consisting 
of an imperial metropole on the one hand and subordinate colonies on the other. As 
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it turns out, the USSR was not an archetypal empire but rather a quite unusual and 
paradoxical one. But perceptions matter. Given the chance to see the Russian ethnic 
core as would-be imperial metropole, it was relatively easy for non-Russians to take 
the next step and see themselves as the exploited periphery. Gorbachev’s democratic 
reforms then provided the final touch by providing non-Russian nationalists the space 
they needed to turn their perceptions into anti-state agitation.
If one line of research has emphasized how the ethno-federal structures and 
institutions helped weaken the Soviet state, other work has emphasized the effect of 
the nationalist discourses that were so powerful at the time. Descriptions of Soviet 
nations “awakening,” “rising,” or “coming out of the refrigerator” were common in the 
perestroika years, deployed almost as readily by scholars as by nationalist organizers, 
all of which tended to underscore the view that the 1980s USSR had always been a 
country of “captive peoples” who were finally doing what they had surely wanted to do all 
along, which was to insist on revamping the Soviet system to provide them with genuine 
national autonomy or, alternatively, to reject the system altogether and declare political 
independence12. If social scientists were writing this way, it was in large part because 
they were echoing the broader nation-laden discourses of the time, which represented 
nations as objective facts and human-like historical actors. The democratic reforms of 
glasnost’ were allowing the Soviet nations to “wake up” and “find their voice.” It followed, 
then, that they would quickly get out of bed and spring into action. 
Since 1991, however, this essentialist view of the operations of nationality has 
been drastically revised and the norm today is to see national mobilization as the product 
of a much more complicated process of sociocultural invention and wily adaptation to 
political circumstance. In effect, primordialism — the view that nations are natural and 
permanent — has been largely displaced by constructivism — the view that nations 
are contingent and historical. Thus, rather than a scenario in which nations suddenly 
“come to life” thanks to Gorbachev’s reforms, scholars explain the intensity of nationalist 
mobilization during the glasnost’ years as a function of nationalist organizers taking 
advantage of the shared space of the USSR to borrow and diffuse nationalist “ideas and 
methods of action.” The basic ethno-territorial structure of the state clearly played a 
key role in creating these national attachments, but so, too, did responses to concrete 
events, such as violent anti-nationalist crackdowns by Soviet authorities in the Baltic 
region and flare-ups of interethnic violence in the Caucasus, which then ricocheted, 
creating a “tidal movement” of national tactical interventions and protests across what 
was still a common “political environment.” In other words, structure was critical but so, 
too, was agency — indeed, the two are inherently linked and played inseparable roles 
within the dynamic that helped produce the Soviet collapse13.
Finally, history was also important. The legacy of the Baltic republics’ political 
independence during the interwar period, for example, played a key role in legitimating 
Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian calls for autonomy and later for outright secession from 
the USSR in the late 1980s.14 Deep resentments over the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression 
Pact, which ultimately paved the way to the Soviet annexation of the Baltic in 1939–1940, 
boiled furiously during the perestroika years once the Secret Protocols were published15. 
These passions were symptomatic of the way in which historical grievance helped to fuel 
much of the fire that would eventually burn through the USSR’s “communal apartment.” 
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Even the Russians, the would-be “leading nationality” of the state, carried grievances 
against the Soviet order, since many Russian nationalists were convinced that their people 
had suffered as much, if not more, than anyone else from the crimes and indignities of 
the Communist system16. Indeed, perceptions of history mixed and matched with multiple 
other regional factors, even factors of daily life at the local level, to transform the USSR 
of the late perestroika years into a generalized field of mobilized nationality. It was very 
difficult not to be political during the perestroika years — and being political at the time 
meant, in effect, being and acting in national terms. The most sophisticated analyses 
of the perestroika years now take all of these factors into account to explain why ethnic 
mobilization proved to be such an important factor in the demise of the USSR17.
From Soviet Pseudo-Federalism to Something New? Questions of Federal 
Structure and Separatism in the Yeltsin and Putin Eras
Emerging from the undoing of the Soviet Union in late December 1991, the newly 
independent Russian Federation faced a raft of existential questions. How would power 
be shared between the state’s different ethnic communities? What would — or should — 
be the proper relationship between center and periphery? Where would meaningful 
sovereignty reside — in Moscow or in the provinces and republics? As a result of the 
break-up of the Soviet state, some 25 million ethnic Russians now found themselves 
outside their supposed homeland — what would happen to them? Lastly, how would newly 
independent Russia manage the powerful crosscurrents of ethnic nationalism that had 
been such a creative-destructive force in the last years of perestroika? The process of 
“ethno-fracturing” that broke up the Soviet Union did not necessarily have an obvious end 
point. The American political scientist Ian Bremmer coined the expression “matrioshka 
nationalism” to describe the ever smaller national units that might continue to split off 
from the new states of Eurasia, like one matrioshka doll emerging from another18. Was 
the new Russia fated to crack up into ever smaller states the same way that Russian 
independence was itself created by the disintegration of the USSR? 
Such questions were indeed asked at the time, all of which helps to explain the 
anxieties about separatism that stirred so uncomfortably in Russian life in the early 
post-Soviet years. But at the same time, the new Russia was, in fact, quite different from 
the USSR that had preceded it, and by comparison, there was much more holding it 
together. For one, its population was far more ethnically homogenous. Ethnic Russians 
constituted the overwhelming majority of the Russian Federation’s population at the 
time of independence — over 80 %. (By contrast, they made up less than 50 % of the 
Soviet population at the time.) The territory of the Russian state was also more uniform 
in terms of national administration. Only about 30 % of Russian state territory fell within 
the borders of national republics, such as Tatarstan or Yakutia, and such national areas 
accounted for only about 20 % of the state population. The vast share of the country’s 
territory and people were distributed between administrative units that were not just 
majority Russian but vastly so. In 1996, of the 21 national republics in the country, the 
titular national group represented a majority in only 5 (Tuva, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North 
Ossetia, and the Chuvash Republic). In all the others, Russians were either a majority 
or a plurality. All this meant that the issue of nationality was likely to figure differently in 
Russian politics than it had in the former USSR19.
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Still, the great questions of the early life of the new federation have turned very 
much on how the national and regional diversities of the state were to work together, and 
consequently, these have also been the central questions of Western scholarship. Russian 
politics in the post-Soviet period has been dominated by two figures — Boris Yeltsin 
(President: 1991–1999) and his successor, Vladimir Putin, who has served continuously 
as either Prime Minister or President since 1999. Generally speaking, Yeltsin is identified 
with what could be called the “soft” course on issues of national and regional autonomy, 
Putin with a “hard” one. Yeltsin was thus a “de-centralizer,” ready to hand away power 
to the regions, while Putin has proven to be the opposite — a committed “centralizer” 
intent on consolidating a de facto unitarian state based on a strict “vertical of power” 
even while granting degrees of regional and national autonomy in certain areas, such 
as language and religious policy. Moving beyond these general differences, however, 
it becomes clear that neither Yeltsin the would-be champion of federalism nor Putin 
the apparent anti-federalist have been able to create truly institutionalized solutions for 
addressing Russia’s national and regional diversity. Putin’s “federalism-lite” rests more 
on his personal authority than on the rule of law, while Yeltsin’s pro-federalist stance also 
frequently flaunted the Russian constitution. And each leader, the “soft” and the “hard,” 
found himself drawn into brutal and costly wars in Chechnya. The region is stable today, 
but it would be hard to read the Chechen case as a success story of either centralization 
or federalism. Most of the issues there have been frozen rather than resolved. 
Overall, Western scholars (as I’ve suggested here) have been skeptical of a genuine 
interest on the part of either the Yeltsin or the Putin administrations in building a law-
based federal structure that might be able to address some of the glaring socioeconomic, 
constitutional, and political asymmetries of Russia’s post-Soviet landscape. By the 
same token, it’s important to note that specialists in the West are themselves hardly 
without fault. Western studies often credit Moscow with greater power over events than 
it actually commands, and they have committed their own sins of mistaken emphasis, 
such as the tendency in the 1990s to exaggerate the threat of separatism in Russia to 
the point, in some cases, of foreseeing imminent national collapse20.
The best contributions to Western research on ethnic and federal questions in post-
Soviet Russia, by contrast, have avoided making sweeping prognostications and have 
focused instead on smaller-scale work — studies of regions and topical case-studies, 
in particular — which highlight the full complexity of Russia’s ethno-territorial mosaic. 
For example, the field now has a number of excellent studies of nationality policy that 
examines issues such as the 1993 constitution and the new internal passport law of 1997, 
which removed the requirement that Russian citizens indicate their personal ethnicity in 
the document — the famous “Line Five” of the old Soviet passport21. Western scholars 
have also produced sound studies of national republics such as Tatarstan and Yakutia, 
as well comparisons between national regions that expose the nitty-gritty differences 
that have produced greater or lesser sympathy for separatism in one territory versus 
another22. Some of the research on the wars in Chechnya is also first-rate23, as are 
studies on the identity politics and larger policy questions connected to the Russian 
diaspora in the “near abroad”24.
By far the greatest concentration of work, however, has focused on the relationship 
between the center and the regions — in effect, on questions of Russian federalism or, 
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if federalism is not the right thing to call it, then the evolving quasi-federal order. The 
Russian state inherited its federal structure from the former USSR, but that structure 
was largely a mirage. As the British political scientist Cameron Ross noted (trenchantly) 
ten years ago, “Although the USSR was formally a federation, and the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was a ‘federation within a federation,’ in reality, 
Soviet federalism was a sham.” Ross then goes on to quote a candid admission from a 
speech on nationality policy that Gorbachev gave to the Politburo in 1989: “Up to now our 
state has existed as a centralized and unitary state and none of us yet has the experience 
of living in a federation”25. Seen in this light, the apparent zig-zag from the early-to-mid 
1990s when Yeltsin busily signed bilateral treaties with the regions and famously offered 
them “as much autonomy as [they] could swallow,” to the “recentralizing” approach 
underway today under Putin is readily understandable — all of it is part of muddling 
through an imperfect Soviet legacy. And indeed much of the Western scholarship seems 
to approach the question from this vantage26, with some of the most suggestive research 
adopting an explicitly comparative perspective27.
While political scientists have focused largely on questions related to political 
organization, anthropologists, historical sociologists, and specialists in cultural and 
religious studies have examined the two other great preoccupations that tend to dominate 
the field of nationality studies — research on (1) the development and expression of 
national and ethnic identities; and (2) on the patterns and practices of interethnic 
relations. While the scholarship is vast and defies easy generalization, much of it draw 
son various shades of constructivist and institutionalist theory common to social science 
fields in the Western academy. Accordingly, here, too, nationality/ethnicity generally 
appear as constructed rather than primordial categories, with the emphasis falling on 
understanding identity and intergroup relations as contextual and performative — that 
is, as forms of personal and collective expression that are often “acted out” through 
one form or another of ritualized behavior and unavoidably shaped by power relations28.
What becomes clear from even a brief investigation of the scholarship on post-
1991 Russian identities is that just as Soviet federalism left a contradictory legacy for the 
post-Soviet age, the Soviet legacy of identity politics was just as jumbled and confusing. 
Though the Soviet state clearly went to great lengths to promote a socialist vision rooted 
in “ethnic particularism,” the model for this particularism proved to be incomplete and 
in key respects superficial. Thus by the late Soviet period, Mari villagers in the Volga 
region or Yakuts working on collective farms in Eastern Siberia were expected to look 
their respective “national” parts, with the flags, cuisines, adapted Cyrillic alphabets, 
and dance ensembles to prove it. Yet the broader Soviet culture they were supposed 
to identify with was overwhelmingly Russian, including Russian or Russianized cultural 
figures, such as Pushkin, Tchaikovsky, and Sholokhov, and highly Russian symbols of 
Soviet victory or ingenuity, like the massive Rodina-Mat’ statue in Volgograd (Stalingrad) 
or the iconic TV Red Army spy Colonel Maksim Isaev operating under cover as Nazi 
officer Max Otto von Stierlitz. The pressures faced by non-Russians to assimilate varied 
considerably from period to period, as well as from group to group and context to 
context, but the idea, if you were a non-Russian, that being familiar with Russian ways 
was a good thing — this simple fact remained a constant across the Soviet decades. A 
presumption of Russification was inscribed in the Soviet system29.
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Western research on national identities in post-Soviet Russia suggests that this is 
still very much the case. Not surprisingly, given its large Russian majority, the dominant 
archetypes of state-supported culture and patriotism in Russia today are preponderantly 
ethnically Russian and Russocentric, while Putin, the number one “state servitor” and 
surely the most prominent symbol of the new Russia30, presents the ultimate representation 
of a conscientious Russian everyman: though never forgetting to express respect for 
“Russia’s multinational heritage,” his political charisma is premised on presenting 
himself as an ethnic Russian rather than, say, as worldly European cosmopolitan or 
even a multicultural Russian “Soviet.”
New research on nationalism — state-based and ethnic — and on the politics of 
citizenship in post-1991 Russia points to the naturalizing effect of public Russian culture 
in what is now a far less non-Russian country than at any point since the eighteenth 
century and suggests that one of the state’s goals in promoting such a Russian-centered 
patriotism is “to weaken the [non-Russian] ethno-national demands that marked the 
democratic experiments of the [early] post-Soviet period”31. Scholars see a similarly 
nationally Russian motif at work in the careful appropriation of Soviet-lite symbolism under 
Putin32. (The same is true in an even more obvious sense of symbols borrowed from the 
tsarist era.) Much attention has been paid to rightist national thought, in particular, to the 
programs of neo-Eurasianists like Aleksandr Dugin33; and to the blend of “sub-national” 
and national identities that blend together within certain ways of “being Russian,” for 
example, among the country’s various Cossack communities34.
Overlapping with scholarship on Russian national and ethnic identity, the study 
of religious identity also represents a vibrant research area. Work on the considerable 
Orthodox revival of the last two decades, both as a matter of personal faith and as 
an institutional and political dynamic, has produced impressive material, including 
a burgeoning discussion of desecularization as an analytic for making sense of the 
rise in the power of the Russian Church35. Beyond resurgences of Russianness and 
Orthodoxy, however, Russia today is home to the new beginnings of multiple other 
faiths. Consequently, recent scholarship has explored these revivals as well, examining 
questions of identity and policy among Russian Jews36, Muslims37, Buddhists38, and well 
as the followers of New Age religions39.
Along with the revival of these faiths and questions of identity, scholars have also 
increasingly explored conflicts on religious and ethnic grounds, including interethnic 
violence, racism, religious extremism, and anti-Semitism40. Though Russia has a rich 
history of tolerant interethnic cohabitation and cooperation — and though these realities 
continue to be demonstrable features of Russian public life — it is impossible to ignore 
the fact that interethnic relations have generally deteriorated in Russia since the collapse 
of communism, in part because perceptions of who seems to deserve to belong in the 
state have narrowed dramatically. In his new work on interethnic relations in the North 
Caucasus, Andrew Marshall relays a sobering fact from surveys conducted by Levada 
Center in Moscow: every year since 2001 more than half of Russians polled in Center 
surveys have agreed with the slogan “Rossiia dlia russkikh” (Russia for ethnic Russians), 
and in 2012, the rate of approval for this position stood at almost two-thirds. Marshall 
concludes: “Such feelings are not extreme in Russia but rather are acceptable and 
ordinary”41. It’s clear that scholars will need to continue studying this phenomenon 
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of growing intolerance in the years ahead. Only by studying — and then acting on the 
xenophobia — will there be a chance to reverse it. 
Conclusion
In sum, it’s fair to say that scholarship in the West on questions of national and 
religious life in post-Soviet Russia, is vast and vibrant, in particular, English-language 
British and North American scholarship, which represents the bulk of the literature reviewed 
here. Though historians have made only tentative forays into research on the post-Soviet 
decades, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and other social sciences 
have more than covered the terrain. At the same time, it’s clear that an awareness of 
the historical context is critical for appreciating these issues. The ultimate irony of Soviet 
nationality policy was that in setting out to create a multinational union of non-nationalist 
nationalities, Soviet policy-makers ended up nationalizing the nationalities and sabotaging 
the union. The net result, by the turn of the 1990s, was a population of varying peoples 
living in Soviet space all of whom felt, to one degree or another, more Russian, Tatar, 
Ukrainian, or Uzbek than they felt or wanted to feel Soviet. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
Soviet state collapsed from its own seeming obsolescence a short time later.
In the pursuit of pan-national socialist harmony, the Soviet experiment, paradoxically, 
drew on both virtually boundless ethnophilic enthusiasm on the one hand and remorseless 
anti-national violence on the other. Both these forces created powerful legacies that 
then coursed forward to undo the Soviet state in the perestroika years, and it’s fair to 
say that their shadows still affect Russia today, almost a quarter century after the end 
of the USSR. 
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